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I. Introduction
As in most fields of the law, the law pertaining to real property security transactions is continually evolving. l That evolving process is highlighted by the current trend of the California
Supreme Court allowing the parties, at the inception of their
transaction, to freely elect the true nature of the transaction~
and thereafter be bound by that election. At the inception
of a security transaction, the true nature of that transaction
is limited only by the imagination and relative bargaining
positions of the parties. In determining this true nature, the
court will look to substance rather than form. Once the true
nature is established, the rights, duties, and obligations of
the parties are determined by the applicable law.
1. For a thorough and complete review and analysis of California real
property security transactions, see Het-
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Transactions, Cal. C.E.B. (1970).
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II. Antideficiency Legislation
A. In General
The prohibition or limitation on the personal liability of a
debtor in a real property security transaction is determined by
applying the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure sections
580b,2 580d,3 and 7264 to the facts of each particular case. 5
2. Code of Civ. Proc. section 580b
provides as follows:
"No deficiency judgment shall lie in
any event after any sale of real property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a
deed of trust, or mortgage, given to the
vendor to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a dwelling for not more than
four families given to a lender to
secure repayment of a loan which was
ill fact used to pay all or part of the
purchase price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser." (Italicized portions added by
1963 amendment.)
3. Code of Civ. Proc. section 580d
provides, in part:
"No judgment shall be rendered for
any deficiency upon a note secured by
a deed of trust or mortgage upon real
property hereafter executed in any case
in which the real property has been
sold by the mortgagee or trustee under
power of sale contained in such mortgage or deed of trust."
4. Code of Civ. Proc. section 726
provides in part:
"There can be but one form of action
for the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real property, which action
must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter . . . . The decree for the foreclosure of a mortgage
or deed of trust secured by real property or any interest therein shall declare
CAL LAW 1970
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the amount of the indebtedness or right
so secured and, unless judgment for any
deficiency there may be between the
sale price and the amount due with
costs is waived by the judgment creditor or a deficiency judgment is prohibited by Section 580b, shall determine
the personal liability of any defendant
for the payment of the debt secured by
such mortgage or deed of trust and shall
name such defendants against whom a
deficiency judgment may be ordered following the proceedings hereinafter prescribed. In the event of such waiver,
or if the prohibition of Section 580b is
applicable the decree shall so declare
and there shall be no judgment for a
deficiency. In the event that a deficiency is not waived or prohibited and
it is decreed that any defendant is personally liable for such debt, then upon
application of the plaintiff filed at any
time within three months of the date of
the foreclosure sale and after a hearing
thereon at which the court shall take
evidence and at which hearing either
party may present evidence as to the
fair value of the property or the interest therein sold as of the date of sale,
the court shall render a money judgment against such defendant or defendants for the amount by which the
amount of the indebtedness with interest and costs of sale and of action exceeds the fair value of the property or
interest therein sold as of the date of
sale; provided, however, that in no
event shall the amount of said judgment, exclusive of interest from the
date of sale and of costs exceed the
423
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B. Purchase Money Antideficiency Protection: Code of
Civil Procedure Section 58Gb
Prior to the 1963 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure
section 580b, the identity of the person furnishing the "purchase money" was immateria1. 6 No distinction was made between a vendor and a third-party lender. In either case, the
person furnishing all or any part of the purchase price and
taking a note secured by a deed of trust, mortgage, or contract
of sale on the purchased property could not get a deficiency
judgment against the purchaser.
With the enactment of the 1963 amendment to section
580b, the identity of the person furnishing the purchase money
became material, as did the character of the purchased property. Section 580b, as it now reads, does not change the result
as to a lender of purchase money for residential property as
defined by section 580b or as to a vendor. However, all other
third-party lenders are not subject to the provisions of section
580b.
1. Distinction Between Lender and Vendor

In Kistler v. Vasi,7 the plaintiffs were real estate brokers
who took a note from the defendants in 1965, as part of their
commission. The note was secured by a second deed of trust
on the unimproved property purchased by the defendants. A
sale under the first deed of trust wiped out the plaintiffs' security, and they commenced this action to recover on the note.
The Court held that plaintiffs were "lenders" under the amended section 580b, and were therefore not precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment.
difference between the amount for
which the property was sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness secured
by said mortgage or deed of trust

"
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5. Code of Civ. Proc. section 580a,
allowing deficiency judgments following
sale under the power contained in a
deed of trust, is no longer effective in
light of Code of Civ. Proc. section
424

580d.
See also Roseleaf Corp. v.
Chierighino, 59 Ca1.2d 35, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97 (1963).
6. Bargioni v. Hill, 59 Cal.2d 121, 28
Cal. Rptr. 321, 378 P.2d 593 (1963).
7. 71 Cal.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 170,
455 P.2d 106 (1969). For a further discussion of this case, see Bernhardt,
REAL PROPERTY, and YORK, REMEDIES,
in this volume.
CAL LAW 1970
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This case is important not only for the actual decision, but
also for establishing the framework in which to analyze the
applicability of section 580b. The Court stated as follows. s
[U]nder the plain language of the 1963 amendment
to section 580b plaintiffs are lenders and not vendors.
The amendment expressly distinguishes between lenders
of purchase money and vendors and contemplates that
the parties to a sale of real property, other than the defined residential property, may freely elect to arrange for
the financing of the purchase price in ways that may
wholly or in part limit the vendee's protection from deficiency judgments. If the parties wish to afford full
protection to the vendee, they may provide that all security instruments be given to the vendor, in which case subsequent assignees from the vendor would take subject
to section 580b. If the vendor is not willing to accept
such extensive risks, however, he may insist that all or
part of the purchase price be financed by third parties,
whose remedies are not affected by section 580b. Moreover, in such a case it is immaterial whether the third
party who assists in the financing makes a payment of
part of the price to the vendor in exchange for the vendee's note and deed of trust or, as in this case, discharges
an existing obligation of the vendor in exchange for the
vendee's note and deed of trust. 9
Two months prior to the California Supreme Court decision
in Kistler v. Vasi, the Court of Appeals decided Jackson v.
Taylor. 10 Here again, the issue before the Court was whether
a sold-out junior was a "vendor" or "lender" within the amended section 580b. In Jackson, the plaintiffs, in 1961, sold unimproved real property to Rodens, and, as part of the purchase
8. 71 Ca1.2d - , - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
170, 171-172, 455 P.2d 106, 107-108.
9. Suppose the real estate brokers in
Kistler had previously assigned their
note and deed of trust to the vendors of
the property, who then commenced the
action against the vendee. Would secCAL LAW 1970

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

tion 580b then preclude a deficiency
judgment?
10. 272 Cal App.2d 1, 76 Cal. Rptr.
891 (1969). For a further discussion
of this case, see Rohwer, CONTRACTS,
in this volume.
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price, took back a note and deed of trust on the purchased
property. The deed of trust was subsequently subordinated
when Rodens constructed seven rental dwelling units on the
purchased property. In 1965, Rodens sold the property to
the defendants, and, as part of the transaction, plaintiffs surrendered the Rodens' note and deed of trust in return for a new
note from the defendants secured by a second deed of trust on
the same property. A sale under the first deed of trust wiped
out the plaintiffs' security, and they instituted this action on
the note. The Court held that plaintiffs were "vendors" as
to the defendants, and thereby were precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment. The Court stated:
When the 1965 transaction involved herein is analyzed,
it is clear that, even though the Rodens were the legal
owners of the property, plaintiffs also were necessary
parties in the transfer of the property to defendants and
that, by consenting to, and participating in the sale of the
property to defendants, plaintiffs were vendors of their
interest as beneficiaries under the original trust deed.
Moreover, it is clear that the 1965 note and trust deed
were given by defendants to plaintiffs as 'a necessary part
of the purchase price of the property'. For these reasons
we must conclude that plaintiffs were vendors with respect to the 1965 purchase which brings the 1965 note
and trust deed within provisions of section 580b as
amended. l1
Jackson cannot be reconciled with Kistler. In Jackson, the
plaintiffs were "vendors" of the property as to Rodens, but
not as to defendants. Under Kistler, the applicability of section 580b is determined by its "plain language." If section
580b were intended to preclude a prior vendor from obtaining
a deficiency judgment against a subsequent purchaser, the
statute would have read "to a vendor" and not, as actually
written, "to the vendor." Also, the reference to "vendor" under section 580b must, of necessity, refer to a seller of real

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/14

11. 272 Cal. App.2d 1, 6-7, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 891, 894-895.
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property. The holder of a beneficial interest under a deed of
trust holds personal property and not real property.
Under the amended section 580b, the relationship of the
parties, each as to the other, must be analyzed. For example,
if A sells nonresidential property to B, and, as part of the purchase price, A takes back a promissory note secured by a deed
of trust on the purchased property, A is a "vendor" as to B.
However, if B then sells the property to C, who either assumes
A's note and deed of trust or issues a new note and deed of
trust to A, A would be a "lender" as to C.
Kincaid v. Gomez 12 demonstrates that the Court will look
to the substance of the transaction in determining the applicability of section 580b. In this case, plaintiff agreed to sell
real property to "Gomez and/or Nominee," and take back, as
part of the purchase price, a note secured by a second deed of
trust on the purchased property. Title to the property was
taken by the nominee, Dolphin Construction Company. A
note was signed by Gomez, Magliocco, and Dolphin Construction Company. Dolphin executed the deed of trust securing
the note. A sale under the first deed of trust wiped out plaintiff's security. Plaintiff, being a sold-out junior, then sued
Gomez and Magliocco to recover on the note. It was stipulated at trial that Gomez and Magliocco were the actual purchasers of the property. The Court held that plaintiff was a
"vendor" and that section 580b, therefore, precluded him
from obtaining a deficiency judgment against Gomez and
Magliocco. It was argued that section 580b was inapplicable,
since Gomez and Magliocco did not execute the deed of trust,
but the Court rejected the argument, stating:
The fact that the deed of trust was executed by the corporation only, for it alone held title, does not mean that
the note was unsecured on respondents' part, thereby
rendering them liable to a personal judgment. Taking
the transaction as a whole, and considering that it was
contemplated from the beginning that there would be a
12. 274 Cal. App.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr.
539 (1969). For a further discussion
of this case, see Bernhardt, REAL PROPCA L LA W 1970
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nominee, that Dolphin Construction Company was the
sole nominee, and that the note expressly says that it is
secured by a deed of trust, we regard the transaction, as
the trial judge did, as a single one. I3
2. "Sold-Out J unior"14
In 1953, Brown v. Jensen I6 held that section 580b precluded
a sold-out junior of purchase-money security from obtaining
a deficiency judgment. Subsequently, in 1963, Roseleat
Corp. v. Chierighino and Bargioni v. Hill left reason to believe
that Brown v. Jensen was no longer the law with respect to
sold-out juniors of purchase-money security.I6
Kistler has apparently reaffirmed Brown v. Jensen. Kistler
not only cited Brown favorably, but it observed that if the parties had chosen another method for the payment of plaintiffs'
commission, the defendants would have been afforded the
protection of section 580b. Since the most likely alternative
method would have been for the defendants to give a note and
deed of trust to the vendors, who in turn would have assigned
it to the plaintiffs, and since the plaintiffs were, in fact, sold-out
juniors, the reasoning is that a sold-out junior would still be
precluded by section 580b from recovering a deficiency judgment.
California Court of Appeals decisions in Kincaid v. Gomez,
supra, and Jackson v. Taylor, supra, have held that section
580b bars a sold-out junior of purchase-money security from
obtaining a deficiency judgment.
3. What Constitutes the "Purchase Price"?
In Pond v. Schwartz,17 the defendant conveyed an undivided
one-half interest in real property to the plaintiffs. The plain13. 274 Cal. App.2d - , - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 539, 540-541.
14. A "sold-out junior" is the holder of a junior deed of trust or mortgage
whose security has been wiped out by
a judicial or nonjudicial sale under a
senior deed of trust or mortgage.
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15. 41 Cal.2d 193, 259 P.2d 425
(1953).
16. See Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A
New Judicial Approach, 51 Cal. L. Rev.
1 at 11 (1963).
17. 268 Cal. App.2d 572, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 353 (1968).
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tiffs agreed (1) to execute a $30,000 note secured by a deed
of trust on the purchased undivided one-half interest and
(2) that their undivided one-half interest in the property
"is to be deemed security for any losses suffered" by defendant in an unrelated transaction. The Court affirmed the trial
court's holding that the agreement between the parties was that
the "purchase price" was $30,000 plus the loss suffered by
the defendant in the unrelated transaction, and that the defendant was precluded by section 580b from obtaining a deficiency judgment against the plaintiffs. 18
The Court's conclusion in Pond that the two obligations
(one of which carried no promise to pay) constituted the "purchase price" for the undivided one-half interest demonstrates
the amount of care that must be taken in setting up any such
transaction to avoid having the "purchase price" include more
than the parties anticipate.
III. Guarantors and Sureties

In situations involving a guarantor of a secured obligation,
the analysis of any particular transaction will encompass one
or more of the following areas: (a) The nature and extent
of the guaranty; (b) The rights, duties, and obligations of the
guarantor and of the secured creditor, as to each other; (c)
Whether the guarantor has waived, or is estopped from asserting, his rights against the secured creditor; (d) The rights,
duties, and obligations of the guarantor and of the secured
debtor, as to each other; and (e) The effect of the antideficiency legislation.
18. The purchase agreement in question was executed on June 23, 1960,
and when the Court referred to the applicability of section 580b, 268 Cal.
App.2d 572, 580, 74 Cal. Rptr. 353,
358, it sets forth section 580b, as
amended in 1963. Inasmuch as the
same result would follow under section
580b before it was amended, the referCAL LAW 1970
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ence to the amended section 580b is
probably an oversight by the Court, and
should not br relied on as indicating the
amendment to be retroactive. See Civ.
Code section 3 and Code of Civ. Proc.
section 3, stating that provisions of
codes are not retroactive unless expressly so declared.
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A. Nature and Extent of the Guaranty
In Roberts v. Graves,19 Meadowbrook Developers, Inc. purchased real property from Roberts, and, as part of the purchase price, executed a $33,000 promissory note secured by a
second deed of trust on the purchased property. Graves
signed the note "individually and as Co-guarantor." Extrinsic
evidence, developed at the trial, showed that Graves knew
Roberts would be hypothecating the note and deed of trust
to a bank in order to borrow $16,500, and that the bank
would not make the loan to Roberts unless Graves personally
guaranteed the purchase-money note. A sale under the first
deed of trust wiped out the security of Roberts, who then commenced this action against Graves as a guarantor. The Court
held that Graves only guaranteed the note to the extent of the
$16,500 borrowed from the bank, and further held that section
580b does not protect a guarantor of purchase-money security.
A "dragnet" or "omnibus" clause in a guaranty agreement
provides that the guaranty encompasses all sums of money that
the creditor has previously loaned, or that the creditor subsequently loans, to the debtor. A similar clause in a deed of
trust provides that the deed of trust is given to secure the payment of all moneys now and hereafter due or owing from
the trustor to the beneficiary.
In Beverly Hills Nat. Bank v. Glynn,20 defendant Glynn, an
attorney experienced in financial affairs, executed a guaranty
containing a "dragnet" clause in favor of the bank. Prior
to the execution of the guaranty, the bank had made two loans
to the debtor. The bank sued Glynn on the guaranty for the
amount of the two earlier loans. The Court held Glynn liable
on the guaranty for the two notes executed by the debtor prior
to Glynn's execution of the guaranty, and stated that "the
language patently put him on notice that there had been earlier
loans."
19. 269 Cal. App.2d 410, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (1969).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/14
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20. 267 Cal. App.2d 859, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 808 (1968); modified 268 ACA
612, 73 Cal. Rptr. 808.
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Beverly Hills Nat. Bank v. Glynn, supra, should be compared with Gates v. Crocker-Anglo Nat. Bank/ wherein the
Court held a dragnet clause in a deed of trust inapplicable
to one of the co-trustors for a prior unsecured loan made by the
bank to the other co-trustor. The Court reasoned that plaintiff, being totally unaware of the prior unsecured loan, presumably would not have executed the deed of trust had he known
that the dragnet clause contained therein would render him
liable as a surety for his cotenant's individual debt.
In essence, the Beverly Hills Nat. Bank v. Glynn case holds
that a dragnet clause imparts at least constructive notice to
the guarantor of the existence of prior loans, whereas the
Gates v. Crocker-Anglo Nat. Bank case holds to the contrary.
Because of the differing approaches used by the Courts in
analyzing the applicability of dragnet clauses, the creditor
should tell the guarantor or co-trustor of any prior loans it
made to the debtor, and, correspondingly the guarantor or
co-trustor should ask the creditor about the existence of any
prior loans made to the debtor.
The dragnet clause raises issues regarding two separate
notes or debts secured by a single deed of trust on real property. Issues yet to be decided are:
( 1) If the secured creditor holds a sale under the power
on only one of the notes, does section 580d preclude a deficiency judgment on the second note, and, if not, does the
secured creditor have the uncontrolled discretion as to which
note he treats as secured and which note unsecured?
(2) If the secured creditor brings a judicial foreclosure
action on one of the notes, does Code of Civil Procedure section 726 limit or preclude a deficiency judgment on the second
note, or, if the creditor first obtains a personal judgment on
one of the notes, has he then waived his security for the second
note, and possibly waived the debt itse1f?2
1. 257 Cal. App.2d 857, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 536 (1968).
2. For discussion on section 580d
"note" and section 726 "debt," see Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations
in California-A New Judicial ApCAL LAW 1970
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proach, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1963); see
also Gates v. Schuster, 227 Cal. App.2d
287, 38 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1964) and
Loretz v. Cal-Coast Dev. Corp., 249
Cal. App.2d 176, 57 Cal. Rptr. 188
(1967).
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B. Rights, Duties, and Obligations of the Guarantor and
of the Secured Creditor, as to Each Other

In Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki,3 the California Supreme Court held that a creditor has a duty to disclose facts
it knows about the debtor to the guarantor if (a) the creditor
has reason to believe that those facts materially increase the
risk beyond that which the guarantor intends to assume, (b)
the creditor has reason to believe that the facts are unknown
to the guarantor, and (c) the creditor has a reasonable opportunity to communicate the facts to the guarantor. If the guarantor establishes all of the above conditions, he will be discharged from liability to the creditor.
In Union Bank v. Brummell,4 Brummel guaranteed a nonpurchase-money secured note to Union Bank. The bank held
a nonjudicial sale, bid in less than the secured obligation, and
commenced this action to recover the deficiency against Brummell on his guaranty. The Court, relying on Union Bank v.
Gradsky,5 held that the bank, by holding the nonjudicial sale,
had exercised an election of remedies that destroyed Brummell's subrogation rights against the principal debtor, and that
it was thereby precluded from recovering the deficiency from
the guarantor.
Thus, a secured creditor whose obligations are guaranteed
has three remedies from which to choose: ( 1) He may bring
a judicial foreclosure action, joining both the debtor and the
guarantor; (2) he may sue the guarantor on the guaranty for
the full amount of the unpaid balance of the principal obligation without proceeding against the debtor or the security; or
(3) he may realize on the security by way of a nonjudicial
sale. If the creditor elects to use the nonjudicial sale (Union
Bank v. Brummell) and thereby terminates the guarantor's
rights against either the security or the principal debtor, he will
be precluded from recovering the deficiency from the guarantor.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/14

3. 70 Cal.2d 81, 73 Cal. Rptr. 564,
4. 269 Cal. App.2d 836, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 234 (1969).
447 P.2d 956 (1968). For a further
discussion of this case, see Rohwer,S. 265 Cal. App.2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr.
CONTRACTS, in this volume.
64 (1968).
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The reviewing Courts have not yet decided whether a secured creditor of a purchase-money obligation (as opposed to
a nonpurchase-money obligation, as in Union Bank v. Brummell) , after holding a nonjudicial sale and bidding in less than
the full amount of the principal obligation, can proceed
against the guarantor for the deficiency. A logical extension
of the Union Bank v. Brummell decision would seem to preclude the secured creditor from pursuing the guarantor after
holding a nonjudicial sale. In a nonpurchase-money situation such as Union Bank v. Brummell, the guarantor's subrogation rights would allow him to obtain a deficiency judgment
against the debtor if the secured obligation exceeds the fair
market value of the secured property on the date of the
judicial foreclosure sale, and then only to the amount
of the excess. 6 There was no discussion as to the fair
market value of the secured property in Union Bank v.
Brummell, and, accordingly, it cannot be determined whether a deficiency judgment could have been obtained against the
debtor. However, whether a deficiency judgment would lie
or not, the guarantor, upon payment to the secured creditor,
would have been subrogated to the security. In a situation
involving a guarantor of a purchase-money obligation, there
would be no possibility of a deficiency judgment, but the
guarantor would have a right to be subrogated to the security.
C. Whether Guarantor Has Waived, or Is Estopped
From Asserting, His Rights Against the Secured
Creditor
In Wiener v. Van Winkle,7 the Court held that the defendant guarantor could, and did, waive Civil Code section 2845
(right of guarantor to require creditor to proceed against the
principal, or to pursue any other remedy in his power that
the guarantor cannot himself pursue and that would lighten
his burden) and section 2849 (guarantor is entitled to benefit
of security held by the creditor).
6. Code of Civ. Proc. § 726.
7. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
761 (1969). For a further discussion
CAL LAW 1970
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Both Union Bank v. Grady and Union Bank v. Brummell
stated that a guarantor can waive his defense to the creditor's
action to recover a deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial
sale, but that the defense had not been waived in those particular cases.

D. Effects of Antideficiency Legislation
Roberts v. Graves, supra, held that a guarantor of a purchase-money secured obligation is not entitled to section 58Gb
protection.
IV. Vendor's Lien

Civil Code section 3046, provides that one who sells real
property has a vendor's lien thereon, independent of possession, for so much of the price as remains unpaid and unsecured
otherwise than by the personal obligation of the buyer.
Civil Code section 3048, provides that a vendor's lien is
valid against everyone claiming under the debtor, except a
purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for value.
In Valley Vista Land Co. v. Nipomo Water & Sewer Co.,s
Valley Vista conveyed land to Nipomo, and the latter agreed
to install certain water and sewer facilities on other land owned
by Valley Vista. Nipomo failed to make the installations.
Nipomo then executed a deed of trust to its creditors, who took
without knowledge of Valley Vista's rights. The Court held
that Valley Vista had a vendor's lien (the amount thereof
being equal to the fair market value of the land conveyed by
Valley Vista, which was presumed to be the value of the services and facilities promised by Nipomo), but that the vendor's
lien was not valid against the creditors. It further held that
the creditors were encumbrancers in good faith and for value
within the meaning of Civil Code section 3048.
The advantage of a vendor's lien is that the vendor can
elect to either sue on the unsecured note without any "one
form of action" or anti deficiency limitations, or, alternatively,
8. 266 Cal. App.2d 331, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 181 (1968).
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can foreclose his vendor's lien. 9 However, a major drawback
to relying on a vendor's lien is that the lien will be invalid as
against a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer for value
who takes without actual or constructive notice of the lien.
One possible solution to the problem is to record the deposit
receipt or agreement of sale, prior to the sale, designating
therein that the seller is taking an unsecured promissory note
from the buyer as part of the purchase price (being careful not
to inadvertently create a mortgage by the use of any security
language) . This should preclude any subsequent purchaser
or encumbrancer from claiming "good faith" because constructive knowledge of the vendor's lien will be imparted to
him due to the recordation of the deposit receipt or agreement
of sale.
Two practical problems, as yet undecided by the reviewing
Courts, relate to the rights of a holder of a venQor's lien to reinstate a prior deed of trust or mortgage and to redeem from a
prior deed of trust or mortgage.
Almost all secured promissory notes contain a provision
that the holder thereof has the right to declare all sums immediately due and payable on any default under the note and/or
deed of trust. Civil Code section 2924c, limits the right to
accelerate full payment of the secured obligation, and provides
that "the trustor or mortgagor or his successor in interest
. . or any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record" has the right to cure an existing default
on payment of only the delinquent installments plus certain
charges. Since the holder of a vendor's lien does not have a
"subordinate lien or encumbrance of record," it could be
argued that he is not entitled to reinstate a prior mortgage
or deed of trust. However, since Civil Code section 2924c
allows reinstatement by a junior encumbrancer "of record,"
this same section may allow for reinstatement by the holder of
a vendor's lien if the deposit receipt or agreement of sale,
9. See Hetland, Deficiency Judgment
Limitations in California-A New Judicial Approach, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 1 at
19-23 (1963). See also McGreevy v.
Constitution Life Ins. Co., 238 Cal.
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specifying therein that the vendor is taking an unsecured
promissory note for a portion of the purchase price, has been
recorded.
"Redemption" is the right afforded junior lien holders to
protect their interests by paying the full amount secured by
a prior lien, and the redemption rights are set forth in Civil
Code sections 2903, 2904, and 2905. If the vendor's lien is
created at a time when a prior lien is already in existence,
it appears clear that the holder of the vendor's lien can redeem
from the prior lien. However, if a vendor's lien is not valid
against a subsequent encumbrancer in good faith and for
value, under the provisions of Civil Code section 3048, a question arises (and is as yet unanswered) whether the holder
of a vendor's lien has an interest in the real property (section
2903) or is the holder of a junior lien (section 2904) as to
such encumbrancer so as to allow redemption. The above
question may be raised because a senior lien holder can object
to an attempted redemption by a person not holding a valid
lien. lO
V. Equitable Mortgages

In James v. P.C.S. Ginning Co./ 1 the plaintiffs obtained
financing from the defendant, and executed a promissory note
secured by a crop mortgage. As additional collateral, the
plaintiffs executed security agreements and financing statements, which were, in effect, personal property mortgages
covering farming equipment. Listed along with the equipment was an item that read "Equity in House $10,000." Both
parties intended the equity in the home to be security for the
loan. The defendant brought an action on the note as an unsecured creditor and recovered a personal judgment against

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/14

10. In Lee v. Joseph, 267 Cal. App.
2d 30, 72 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1968), the
Court held that when a junior lien holder is seeking redemption, the senior lien
holder has the defense of the junior
lien holder's lack of bona fides available to him. It is therefore arguable
that under the rule of Lee v. Joseph, a
436

senior lien holder could defend redemption by a holder of a junior vendor's
lien on the basis of the invalidity of the
lien.
11. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal.
Rptr. 457. For a further discussion of
this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this
volume.
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the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed voluntary bankruptcy, claiming their home to be exempt by virtue of a homestead recorded
after the defendant recorded its financing statements reflecting
the equity in the home as security for the loan. The court held
that the parties had created an equitable mortgage, and that
the defendant, by recovering a personal judgment, had waived
its equitable mortgage on the home under the "one form of
action" provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 726.

VI. "Due On Sale" Clauses
A "due on sale" clause, commonly found in deeds of trust,
provides that the beneficiary has the option of declaring all
sums secured thereby immediately due and payable on a sale
or transfer of the secured property.
In Hellbaum v. Lytton Sav. & Loan Assn./ 2 Lytton's deed
of trust expressly made applicable a prepayment fee to any
early payment of the unpaid balance that the debtors might be
compelled to make under a right of acceleration established
by the due on sale clause. The Court held that the prepayment fee, coupled with the due on sale clause, was not an invalid restraint on alienation. In this case, the plaintiffs had
a prospective purchaser offering an amount in excess of the
unpaid principal obligation secured by the Lytton deed of
trust. Lytton would consent to an assumption without imposing its due on sale clause only if the buyers would pay a
5 % assumption fee. The buyers refused, the sale fell through,
the plaintiffs then defaulted in their payments to Lytton, and
a nonjudicial sale was subsequently held. Plaintiffs sued
for damages in an amount equal to the difference between
the unpaid balance on the Lytton loan and the amount they
would have received had the sale gone through. The Court,
in dictum, mentioned that if the 5 % assumption fee was so
large as to have no reasonable relationship to the justifiable
interests of the lender, perhaps a factual question could be
presented as to whether in effect the restraint was unreason12. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1969).
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able. However, even if the proposed assumption fee was extremely large, the invalidity of the fee would, presumably, not
invalidate Lytton's right to call the loan, leaving the borrower
in the same position. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs'
arguments of forfeiture and Lytton's alleged duty to permit
assumption of its deed of trust.
Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Assn. 13 held that there is no
implied requirement that a lender act "reasonably" in exercising its option to accelerate on sale or transfer, and that the due
on sale clause does not constitute an invalid restraint on
alienation. This case sets forth the business reasons for a
lender's use of due on sale clauses. One of the most prevalent
reasons is that the clause permits acceleration on transfer, so
that the lender may take advantage of rising interest rates
in the event its borrower transfers the property.
VII. Subordination and Substitution Clauses
The plaintiff in Ruth v. Lytton Sav. & Loan Assn. of Northern Cal.,14 was the beneficial owner of real property standing
in the name of defendant title company under a holding agreement. The plaintiff authorized a sale of the property in which
he anticipated receiving a first deed of trust, and his instructions provided that his deed of trust could be subordinated
to deeds of trust for "a construction and/or takeout loan"
bearing interest of not more than 7.2% per annum, and that
the amount of said loan was to be limited to a sum no greater
than 66t % of the total value of both land and buildings
according to appraisal of the lending institution. Lytton made
a loan of $620,000, 68.84% of appraised value, bearing interest at 6t%, with a provision that Lytton had the option
to increase the interest rate by 2 % on default. The downpayment of $40,000 was paid out of the Lytton loan proceeds.
The defendant title company recorded the Lytton deed of trust
first and plaintiff's deed of trust second. Default was made
in payment to Lytton, which then held a nonjudicial sale, wip13. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 81 Cal.
Rptr. 135 (1969).
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Rptr. 521 (1968); modified 272 CA2d
24,76 Cal. Rptr. 926.
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ing out plaintiff's second trust deed. The Court held Lytton
was bona fide encumbrancer for value, taking without knowledge of the above subordination provision, but held the defendant title company liable for negligence in allowing the
transaction to close, because (a) the "construction loan" did
not include the $40,000 downpayment, (b) the interest limitation was exceeded, and (c) the amount of the loan exceeded
66t% of appraised value. The plaintiff recovered the
amount of his note, interest thereon, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees from defendant title company.
In Connell v. Zaid/ 5 the plaintiffs purchased property from
the defendants' assignors in 1961, and gave them a note secured by a fourth deed of trust, which contained a subordination clause allowing the plaintiffs to subsequently refinance
and consolidate the then existing first, second, and third deeds
of trust, on certain conditions. In August, 1967, the plaintiffs desired to refinance the first, second, and third deeds of
trust, and the defendants refused to execute a subordination
agreement allowing for the new first deed of trust. The plaintiffs commenced an action for specific performance and declaratory relief. The trial court sustained a demurrer without
leave to amend. The reviewing Court distinguished the clause
in the present case from a conventional "subordination" agreement, stating that the conventional agreement relates to new
money coming in for development and improvement of the
land, whereas the clause in this case is one of refinancing with
respect to encumbrances having priority from the inception
of the financial arrangements. Substitution and subordination
are necessarily the same in the sense that each must be founded
on agreement of the parties. The reviewing court reversed
the trial court,. sending the matter back for trial in order that
evidence could be presented as to the meaning of the "subordination" clause.
15. 268 Cal. App.2d 788, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 371 (1969).
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VIII. Release Clauses
The Court of Appeals, in White Point Co. v. Herrington/ 6
refused to grant specific performance of an executory contract
to purchase real property, because the provisions in the contract relating to partial releases from a purchase-money deed
of trust referred only to a per acre release price, without describing the acreage to be released.
A reviewing Court has for the first time considered the
effect of an uncertain release clause in a deed of trust executed
by the purchasers in a consummated sales transaction. In
Lawrence v. Shutt,17 the plaintiffs purchased property from
the defendants for $1,280,000-$250,000 in cash and a
promissory note and deed of trust for $1,030,000. The release clause in the note allowed for releases of "contiguous"
acreage, and although the release clauses were not sufficiently
certain for specific performance, the Court declined to invalidate the entire transaction because to do so would have
created an undue hardship on the plaintiffs and because plaintiffs agreed during trial to waive the release provisions and
purchase the property with the blanket deed of trust. As evidenced by White Point Co. v. Herrington, supra, the opposite
result would have occurred if the foregoing transaction was
only in an executory stage.
Subordination clauses and release clauses are important
elements in the development of land. Subordination clauses
allow the buyer to procure construction and take out loans
for buildings and improvements to be constructed on the
property without the burden of having first to pay the full
purchase price in cash. Release clauses allow development
on a per lot or per acre basis with the payment of a per unit
amount on the purchase money note, and again, do not require
that the full purchase price be paid prior to any release from
the purchase-money deed of trust. The Courts, however, by
imposing stringent conditions for the enforceability of subordination and release clauses, have precluded the effective
use of the clauses. With respect to subordination clauses, it
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/14

16. 268 Cal. App.2d 458, 73 Cal
Rptr. 885 (1968).
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17. 269 Cal. App.2d 749, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 533 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970

20

Cornblum: Secured Transactions

Secured Transactions

appears that setting forth the maximum amount of the prospective first deed of trust, together with the maximum interest rate
(leaving all other provisions for agreement between buyer and
lender), is insufficient unless the buyer also pays a substantial
part of the purchase price in cash.
The problem with definitive release clauses is that the developer, in most instances, desires to have a degree of flexibility
with respect to the path of development. Also, definitive
property descriptions for release clauses usually require that
the property be surveyed and engineered, and as this is an
expensive process, the buyer usually is not willing to undergo
such expense prior to purchasing the property.
It is suggested that many problems involving subordination
and release clauses in deeds of trust can be minimized or
eliminated by the use of trusts in the purchase of real property.
A nondeficiency, unsecured promissory note given to the seller
for part of the purchase price, coupled with stringent limitations on the trustee's powers of financing and developing the
purchased property, can give the buyer a greater degree of
predictability with respect to his purchase, more flexibility in
the mode and manner of development, and the equivalent of
section 580b protection. The seller enjoys, in essence, the
equivalent of a secured position.

IX. Remedies of Seller Under Land Installment Contracts
In Gantner v. lohnson/ 8 Gantner sold real property to Johnson under a land installment contract for the total purchase
price of $68,500. Johnson made payments for several years
and then defaulted. Gantner commenced this action to quiet
title to the property. The Court of Appeals applied the "benefit of the bargain" rule under Civil Code section 3307, as follows: Gantner had been paid principal of $42,801.24, but
his damages were $30,500 ($68,500 contract price less $38,000 fair market value of the property on the date of the
breach) plus damage and repair costs of $9,705.56. The
18. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1969).
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total damages were $40,205.65, and, as Johnson had made
payments of $42,801.24, Gantner was required to pay the defendant (Johnson) $2,595.59.
The Court relied on Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing
Corp.,19 which held that when a vendee has materially
breached his contract, the vendor has an election to rescind
or to enforce the contract, and if he elects to enforce it, the
"benefit of the bargain" rule of Civil Code section 3307 is
applicable. The Court also rejected Johnson's argument that
the reasonable rental value of the property was the measure of
damages to be applied where the vendor sought to quiet title
against a defaulting vendee (Behrendt v. Abraham).20 The
Court merely noted that the "benefit of the bargain" rule was
apparently neither raised nor answered in Behrendt.
In reality, the election is one of measure of damages, and
not an election to rescind or enforce the contract. The vendor
will, obviously, elect the measure of damages that affords him
the greatest recovery. It is unfortunate that the courts do not
treat land installment contracts in the same manner as mortgages and deeds of trust, in which the vendor keeps all payments made to him by the vendee, and the vendor's remedy
is to either judicially foreclose or hold a trustee's sale with
respect to the property. 1
Under a land installment contract, in the event of breach
by the purchaser, the best that the vendor can hope for is to
keep the payments previously made to him, because section
580b will preclude any deficiency judgment against the defaulting vendee.
19. 64 Cal.2d 801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18,
415 P.2d 833 (1966).
20. 64 Cal.2d 182, 49 Cal. Rptr. 292,
410 P.2d 828 (1966).
1. It is important to note that Honey
did not hold Code of Civ. Proc. section
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726 inapplicable to a land installment
contract, but only that the parties had
not sought a judicial foreclosure. See
Hetland, California Real Estate Secure
Transactions, Cal. CEB Sections 3.67
through 3.80 (1970).
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